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Abstract : We analyze the relation between CEO compensation and networks of executive and 
non-executive directors for all listed UK companies over the period 1996-2007. We examine 
whether networks are built for reasons of information gathering or for the accumulation of 
managerial influence. Both indirect networks (enabling directors to collect information) and direct 
networks (leading to more managerial influence) enable the CEO to obtain higher compensation. 
Direct networks can harm the efficiency of the remuneration contracting in the sense that the 
performance sensitivity of compensation is then lower. We find that in companies with strong 
networks and hence busy boards the directors’ monitori g effectiveness is reduced which leads to 
higher and less performance-sensitive CEO compensatio . Our results suggest that it is important 
to have the ‘right’ type of network: some networks enable a firm to access valuable information 
whereas others can lead to strong managerial influence that may come at the detriment of the firm 
and its shareholders. We confirm that there are marked conflicts of interest when a CEO increases 
his influence by being a member of board committees (such as the remuneration committee) as we 
observe that his or her compensation is then significa tly higher. We also find that hiring 
remuneration consultants with sizeable client networks also leads to higher CEO compensation 
especially for larger firms. 
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Introduction 
“The strength of a wide-band professional network is that it gives access to deep 
and tacit knowledge across a range of areas that you could never hope to touch, understand or 
gain access to.” (Mick Cope) 
 
“The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends laws 
human and divine." ... "Applied to corporations which deal with each other it tends to 
disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can serve two masters. In either 
event it tends to inefficiency; for it removes incetive and destroys soundness of judgment. It is 
undemocratic for it rejects the platform: 'A fair field and no favors' " (Louis Dembitz 
Brandeis)1   
 
Social and professional networks govern our lives; they are established through education, 
sports interests, club memberships, as well as connectio s resulting from our professional activities. The 
economics and finance literature has begun to pay more attention to the influence of managers’ and 
non-executive directors’ connections on corporate decision making and monitoring. Indeed, the 
effectiveness of corporate governance and corporate decision making may be significantly affected by 
formal and informal professional and social networks. For instance, Seidel, Polzer and Stewart (2000) 
document the strong impact of social ties on wage negotiations of minorities. The discriminating effect 
against minorities in the recruiting process of US high-tech companies is substantially lower when 
individuals belonging to minorities are referred to the firm by a friend or relative working in that firm. 
Educational networks of mutual fund managers influence their investment decisions as they are more 
likely to invest in firms managed by people who have studied at the same university (Cohen, Frazzini and 
Malloy, 2008a). These investments in ‘connected’ firms perform better. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy 
(2008b) also document the impact of sell-side analysts’ social networks on their ability to collect superior 
information. They find that analysts perform better in terms of their stock recommendations if they have 
educational connections with companies’ directors. Hochberg et al. (2007) conclude that venture capital 
(VC) funds' performance is positively affected by the influence of the network positions enjoyed by the
VCs’ parent firms. In contrast, networks may also have a detrimental effect on decision making. For 
instance, Kuhnen (2009) studies the effect of the professional networks of US mutual funds’ directors n 
their decisions on the hiring and contracting of fund advisors. If a candidate fund advisor is connected to 
the fund’s director through past business relationships, he/she is more likely to be appointed and pai a 
higher management fee. The fact that the returns of funds with advisors connected to the board of 
                                                
1 Brandeis was Associate Justice on the US Supreme Court and made this statement before the passing of the 
Clayton Act (1914) which prohibited extensive director networks as these could lead to collusion in cocentrated 
industries. The quote appeared in the US House of Representatives Staff Report to the Antitrust Committee 
(1965:3). 
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directors are significantly lower than the returns on funds without such connections suggests that 
networks can bring about agency costs. 
This paper examines the role of director networks on the top manager’s compensation and the 
pay-setting process in the UK. It is important to note that we will use the UK definition of a director who 
can be either an executive or a non-executive directo .2 Over the past 15 years, executive compensation 
(around the world) has increased substantially at a pace significantly above inflation. Since the financial 
crisis that commenced in 2007, undeniable excesses in the remuneration policies have become manifest. 
When the S&P 500 stock index fell by 37.6% in 2008, 75% of the CEOs in the 2700 largest US 
companies received remuneration increases. Even in companies at the brink of bankruptcy, departing 
CEOs managed to enjoy huge severance packages. One example is Angelo Mozilo who was the CEO of 
Countrywide Financial that was saved by the Bank of America in June 2008, and was given $188 million 
as a send-off package. The UK situation is similar: n 2009, large companies including Marks & Spencer 
and HSBC generously increased their CEOs’ pay. In spite of academic doubts about the efficiency of the 
remuneration contract design (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003), the public debate on top management 
remuneration only flares up in times of crises such as the corporate governance/accounting disclosure 
crisis of 2000-2003 and the recent financial crisis. Each time, the top management remuneration practices 
are blamed to provide flawed incentives and to induce short-sighted corporate strategies (Hill, 2006). 
Curbing these remuneration practices proves to be difficult as soon as the outrage tones down. The 
arguments from the industry against curtailing manageri l pay are usually that attracting talent 
necessitates adequate compensation as firms would otherwise lose their competitive edge. “We’re a very 
big bank, we employ 200,000 people around the world […]. We have obviously got to pay our people 
appropriately. I think our customers will appreciate that people deserve a fair wage’ (HSBC gives its fat 
cats ₤ 1.6 billion bonuses, 2010 (Guardian)). This is indee  the key question: is it the competitive market 
for managerial talent that sets the compensation contract or is the contracting process hijacked by the 
executive directors? In order to provide a (partial) answer this question, we study whether managerial pay 
and the pay-for-performance sensitivity is affected by professional networks, while controlling for the 
traditional explanations such as shareholder control and board composition.  
Networks may be valuable to the firm for the following reasons: first, connections with (peer) 
companies through directorships enable a firm to gain access to information, even prior to its public 
disclosure. Such information is especially valuable when a firm is planning strategic alliances, mergers or 
acquisitions, or is expanding into new markets. Early notice of critical business changes allows the 
company to reconsider and adjust their own strategy in time. Furthermore, directors with strong networks 
                                                
2 Executive directors are members of the board and exert a senior management position in the company (in the US, 
they would usually be called officers). The non-executive directors (in the US often called directors) are board 
members who are not involved in the daily management; they often are managers in other firms. 
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are or develop into reputable figures in the society wi h access to politicians, employers’ organizations, 
and regulators. A network may also reflect manageril talent and a director’s past success in other firms. 
Thus, a large network reflects information, reputation and experience, and can be regarded as a guarantee 
of an executive director’s quality. For these reasons, directors’ connections may be valuable for a firm 
and translate into higher compensation and/or a different compensation contract structure. Key is that t e 
value of a director to a company depends on the informational advantage generated by these connections, 
which allows a company to increase the compensation of its better connected executive and non-executive 
directors. The examples on pay excesses given above suggest that remuneration contracting is not 
necessarily a means to reduce agency problems but may be an agency problem itself if the remuneration 
contracting process is controlled by top management. Ne worked executive directors may ccumulate 
power and establish a stronger negotiation position vis-à-vis the board (and the remuneration committee) 
such that they are able to design compensation packages that are beneficial to themselves but not to their
corporations.  
While some recent papers, such as Barnea and Guedj (2009) and Horton et al. (2009), relate 
pay to networks, our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we distinguish 
between the different roles of networks: managerial influence accumulation and information collection. 
Second, we separately study the strength of networks at the individual director level and at the company 
level, which are often mixed in the existing literature. Third, in addition to degree and (normalized) 
closeness, the network measures most frequently utilized in the network literature, we also employ 
(normalized) eigenvector centrality and (normalized) betweenness to capture different aspects of 
networks. Fourth, whereas most papers on networks employ cross-sectional data or data on a subset of 
companies (which may de facto invalidate network measurement), we have gathered a large data panel 
consisting of virtually all listed UK companies for a 12 year period (1996-2007), amounting to 13,854 
firm years. Fifth, we control for the role of networks of remuneration consultants in the pay-setting 
process as well as internal and external corporate gov rnance devices (shareholder voting concentration, 
board structure and composition, CEO characteristics, and corporate performance). 
Our empirical analysis generates these insights. Fir t, the network measures that are proxies of 
managerial influence explain higher CEO compensation and lower pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
Network measures that capture access to information nd resources valuable to the firm are related to 
larger CEO remuneration, but do not have any impact on the pay-for-performance sensitivity. We 
demonstrate that managerial influence derived from networks has a stronger impact on compensation than 
the information value of networks. Second, at the company level, we use network measures to test the 
busy board hypothesis. Our results are in line with the hypothesis that companies with strong direct 
connections (which signifies that these directors are active in other firms and may hence be less effective 
monitors of the firm) over-pay their CEOs. Companies with networks yielding better information access 
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pay out a lower compensation to their CEOs, as they ma  rely less on the individual network of the CEO. 
Third, we confirm that there are marked conflicts of interest when a CEO is a member of board 
committees (such as the remuneration committee) becaus  his or her compensation is then significantly 
higher. Fifth, the size of the client network of remuneration consultants increases CEO compensation, 
especially in large firms.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the literature and formulate the 
hypotheses. We describe in Section 3 how networks are c ptured and calculate the centrality measures. 
We discuss the methodology in Section 4 and summarize the descriptive statistics. In Section 5, we 
explain the results, while we discuss the robustnes checks in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The Literature and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Director Networks and CEO Compensation  
The optimal remuneration contracting view has been challenged by the rapid increase in 
managerial compensation and the lack of pay-for-performance sensitivity (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). A 
CEO can influence his remuneration contract when he holds a powerful position on the board, when 
directors are on each others’ remuneration committees which could lead to collusion, when non-executive 
directors are nominated by a dominant CEO, and when s areholder ownership concentration (and hence 
outside monitoring) is weak. We study this managerial power/influence (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 
2002) or skimming (Bertrand and Mulainathan, 2001) view on compensation contracting, and focus – 
while controlling for shareholder control (Mehran, 1995) and board effectiveness (Yermack, 1996) – on 
the relation between executive and non-executive dir ctors’ networks and the CEO’s compensation 
structure.  
A CEO’s network grows stronger when he accepts more ext rnal directorships (Conyon and 
Read, 2004). Such a network can be used to extend th  CEO’s power which could enable him to influence 
board decision-making to his own benefit. We label th  connections built for the purpose of accumulating 
managerial discretion as managerial influence-oriented connections. Networks do not only increase  
director’s influence but they also bring additional skills, knowledge, and information to the company, 
which may lead to corporate governance and performance improvements. Connections maintained for the 
sake of information collection are referred to as information value-oriented connections. Although most 
studies do not distinguish between the two functions f director networks, we use different types of 
centrality measures to describe a network’s different functions. Centrality measures that capture the lev l 
of connectedness in the local region based on adjacent onnections are called the direct centrality 
measures and are proxies for managerial influence (although they also yield information). We call the 
centrality measures that enable us to analyze a director’s position in the entire network by means of his 
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distance to all other directors indirect centrality measures. They are used to evaluate the information 
value-oriented networks. It is important to understand that managerial influence and information 
collection are two aspects of the same network. These two functions are not exclusive; direct measures 
expressing managerial power or influence also capture information collection ability that could benefit the 
company. Nonetheless, the correlation between the direct and indirect centrality measures is low (see 
Section 3). This suggests that direct and indirect measures do indeed capture different aspects of the 
network which necessitates a separate analysis. 
The (normalized) direct centrality measures are degree and eigenvector centrality which 
capture the power of the directors (for calculation details, see Section 3). Our managerial influence 
hypothesis (hypothesis 1) states that: CEOs whose network consists of many direct connections can exert 
more managerial influence which is reflected in higher total compensation with low performance 
sensitivity. The value of the ‘managerial influence’ networks declines in the presence of a board with 
more non-executive directors and of stronger sharehold r power.   
Guedj and Barnea (2009) show that the CEO’s compensatio  augments with network size. 
This result supports their reputation hypothesis: when directors are connected, they relax their monitori g 
of the CEO, which leads to CEO compensation increases. This is also in line with the essence of the 
managerial influence argument. Brown et al. (2009) broaden the professional network by also considering 
connections through education and social activities (golf club, charity organizations, etc). They find a 
positive relation between a CEO’s social network centrality and his total compensation, and an inverse 
relation between centrality and pay-for-performance sensitivity. Larcker et al. (2006) present an analysis 
with new director network measures which distinguish between friendly links and independent 
connections. They show that short friendly links are positively related to CEO compensation but 
negatively related to operating performance. This finding is also in line with the managerial influenc 
hypothesis.  
Director networks can have many advantages at the lev l of information collection. Early 
access to information can give a company a competitive advantage. Such networks may enable firms to 
develop more effective corporate strategies. In the managerial labour market, companies would hire or 
pay more to directors with networks of higher information value. The level of connectedness in terms of 
information transfers can be measured by indirect centrality measures: (normalized) closeness and 
betweenness. Once information emerges and spreads along the paths in director networks, a director with 
a high normalized closeness and betweenness has a higher probability of receiving this information (for 
calculation details, see Section 3). Our information-value hypothesis (hypothesis 2) states that: CEO 
compensation increases with his access to information, which is proxied by his indirect network centrali y 
based on his distance to other directors and his poition in the entire network. The value of this 
information-network is reflected in higher compensation and a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
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Crespi-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster (2008) analyze the correlation between executive directors’ 
pay and networks in Spanish electronics companies and provide evidence that CEO compensation reflects 
the information-collection value of networks. Likewise, Horton et al. (2009) find that executives’ network 
centrality is positively associated with their compensation. Executive directors seem to be rewarded for 
the resources they bring to a firm through their networks, while non-executive directors whose 
connections are more locally constrained earn a higher fee since their isolation may be perceived as an 
indication of their independence and superior monitoring capabilities.  
Besides the individual level network measures, we also build networks at the company level 
where companies are vertices in the graph and shared di ctors are links between companies. The next 
two hypotheses on director networks evaluate the effects of managerial influence and information value 
from the perspective of the company rather than the CEO. In the literature on networks at the company 
level, it is argued that if a company has a strong network, it may be managed less well because 
non-executive directors have less time to monitor their firm and executive directors’ focus is dispersed 
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Malmendier and Tate, 2009). Consequently, the governance of companies 
with many direct links may be deficient and may lead to a non-optimal compensation contracts. Hallock 
(1997) demonstrates that CEOs of interlocked companies earn on average a significantly higher monetary 
compensation than the non-interlocked ones and concludes (as do Fich and White, 2002) that board 
interlocks harm corporate governance efficiency andresult in higher CEO compensation. We therefore 
formulate the busy board/managerial influence hypothesis (hypothesis 3) at the company level: In 
companies with strong networks based on direct links, CEOs’ total compensation is higher with a lower 
pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
If the company as a whole has good access to information throughout its directors’ networks 
based on indirect links and hence does not depend on the CEO’s network alone, there is less need to 
remunerate the CEO for his network. The company canthen reward the CEO solely more for 
performance improvements. Therefore, we formulate the information value hypothesis (hypothesis 4) at 
the company level: The information collection efficiency as measured by indirect centrality at the 
company level negatively affects the size of the CEO compensation package and improves the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
 
2.2 Controlling for Other Determinants of CEO Compensation  
CEO compensation may not only be influenced by networks but also by corporate 
performance, the role of remuneration consultants, CEO characteristics such as tenure, board 
composition, ownership concentration by shareholder type, and some other characteristics including firm




Remuneration consultants have the best access to information on current remuneration 
practices and are influential in setting the remuneration policy of large firms. Through its remuneration 
consultant, firm A may gain access to the remuneration practices in its peer companies. The impact of a
remuneration consultant on the remuneration policy of firm A can be twofold. A sudden increase in the 
remuneration in firm B belonging to a remuneration consultant’s network of clients may be quickly 
copied by the other clients (including A) of the consultant who hence spreads the information on the 
raising of the remuneration benchmarks. In contrast, remuneration consultants may advise that 
remuneration packages be based on objective standards and benchmarks that attenuate the upward spiral 
in compensation. Recent analyses seem to support that remuneration consultants are driving 
compensation up: Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2009), who investigate compensation consultants and 
executive pay in the US and the UK, conclude that CEO compensation is indeed larger and includes more 
equity-based compensation when a remuneration consulta t is hired. Kabir and Minhat (2010) go one step 
further and report that CEOs’ equity-based compensation in the UK linearly increases with the number of 
remuneration consultants a firm hires. Moreover, the larger the consultant’s market share is, the higher the 
CEOs’ remuneration in the firms they advise. The authors conclude that competition between 
remuneration consultants leads to significantly higher executive compensation. We therefore expect a 
larger remuneration consultant network to contribute to higher CEO compensation. 
 
CEO characteristics  
A CEO with longer tenure is likely to obtain a higher remuneration package to compensate 
him for his company-specific human capital. Furthermo e, his long experience may also make him more 
competitive on the managerial labour market (Murphy, 1986). A CEO with long tenure may be more 
entrenched and thus have more influence on his remun ration. This will be especially the case if he has a 
longer tenure than most of the non-executive directors on the board and if he serves on the compensatio  
committee. We use CEO’s tenure and age to proxy for his overall experience (possibly acquired in 
several companies). Thus, we expect that older CEOs and CEOs with longer tenure receive higher pay.  
Only rarely, women are leading listed companies: f male top managers occupy only 3-5% of 
the (executive) board seats in listed US and UK firms. Apart from evidence of the existence of a glass 
ceiling, women managers also seem to be discriminated gainst in terms of salary. For instance, Bertrand 
and Hallock (2001) find that female top executives are earning 45% less than their male colleagues in 
large American companies. Kulich et al. (2011) confirm that only 3% of the executive board members are 
female in all listed UK firms and receive lower compensation than their male counterparts. In addition, 
compensation contracts of female managers are less performance-sensitive than those of male executives: 
female managers’ remuneration packages have less upward potential in case of good corporate 
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performance, but they lose less in case of poor performance. Therefore, we expect that the total 
compensation of female CEOS is lower than that of male CEOs, even under similar performance. 
Although combining the functions of CEO and chairman of the board is discouraged in the UK 
Corporate Governance code, we still find many such cases though predominantly in small and 
medium-sized companies. We expect that the CEO who also assumes the tasks of chairman receives a 
higher remuneration to compensate him for the additional tasks but also because this CEO will be in a 
more powerful position vis-à-vis the other (non-executive) directors (Conyon and Peck, 1998). The 
conflicts of interest even augment when the CEO is also a member of the nomination committee which 
allows him to appoint friends as new board members or when he is a member of the remuneration 
committee. We also control for the notice period included in the CEO’s employment contract, and we 
expect that a longer notice period lowers the level of total compensation. 
 
Board characteristics 
Board composition has often been considered as one of the critical measures of corporate 
governance effectiveness. A high proportion of non-executive directors, eparation of the roles of CEO 
and chairman, and the creation of committees are expected to be important to turn the board into an 
effective governance device. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) confirm their hypothesis on the 
negative relation between CEO pay and board independence. More recent research on the US by 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) indicates that CEO compensation decreases in firms that comply with 
the new and stricter board structure regulations imposed on listed firms by the NYSE and NASDAQ in 
2002-03. If a company has a larger percentage of non-executives on the board, we expect that CEO 
compensation can be restrained and that there is a stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity. Nonetheless, 
the effectiveness of the board has not always been satisfactory. For instance, Franks, Mayer and 
Renneboog (2001) find that non-executives seem to support the executive directors in the UK even in the 
wake of poor performance. If a company has a larger percentage of non-executives on the board, we 
expect that CEO compensation can be restrained and that there is a stronger pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. 
 
Share stake concentration 
A key aspect of corporate governance is the monitori g role exerted by major shareholders 
(Core et al., 1999). Executive directors owning shares in their firm have incentives that are more aligned 
with those of the other shareholders. Therefore, executive ownership may lead to more modest 
compensation packages. Less excessive compensation and a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity will 
arise in the presence of major share blocks held by non-executive directors (whose fiduciary obligations 
to monitor are now enhanced by stronger voting power) and by outside shareholders such as corporations, 
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and individuals and families whose voting power ince tivises them to be active monitors. Given that the 
vast majority of institutional investors are rather passive monitors, we expect their presence to havelittle 
effect on CEO compensation. 
 
Firm characteristics 
Company size has been shown to explain most of the cross-sectional variation in total 
managerial compensation (Murphy, 2000; Core et al., 1999). Larger companies pay their CEOs 
substantially more than medium-sized and small companies as it takes specific (and rare) managerial 
talent to lead large corporations, which also entails l rger responsibilities. Therefore, we also expect that 
CEO compensation increases with firm size. 
Including corporate performance-related incentives in the remuneration contracts is key in the 
classic principal-agent framework (Grossman and Hart, 1983). However, neither accounting nor stock 
market performance measures are perfect benchmarks. The former are backward looking and are liable to 
manipulation by the management in order to augment their bonus (Healy, 1985; Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006). Using stock prices as the yardstick has the advantage that one concentrates on (future) 
value creation, but can induce a myopic focus on the s ort term. Frequent overvaluation and 
undervaluation due to market sentiment may enable the management to take decisions that cater to this 
sentiment whilst aiming at maximizing their variable pay. We will include both accounting and stock 
performance measures in our models. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Renneboog and Trojanowski 
(2005) show that the benchmarks chosen in the remunration contracts depend on the relative power of 
the management. Managers without principals prefer accounting benchmarks, and are frequently not 
remunerated for their intrinsic qualities but are paid for luck. In this study, we expect that the CEO’s total 
compensation, salary, bonus, and equity-based compensation are sensitive to the company’s performance, 
measured by both accounting and stock market performance. 
It may take a CEO with specific human capital to manage a firm with a high level of riskiness. 
A risk-averse CEO may demand higher remuneration or a l w pay-for-performance relation embedded in 
the contract to compensate him for managing a firm with more volatile cash flows or with a higher 
probability of financial distress. 
 
3. Capturing Networks 
 
3.1. The Network Definitions 
To quantify directors’ networks, we resort to several graph-theoretical measures. Figure 1 
depicts the director network surrounding Andy Hornby, the CEO of HBOS plc, a banking and insurance 
company. Directors in HBOS plc are the dark grey circles at the right bottom corner. In 2006, Andy 
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Hornby was also a non-executive director in the lif assurance and unit trust company St. James's Place
plc, and in the retail companies GUS plc and Home Retail Group plc. This example is a fragment of a 
complete director network whereby a director is denot d by a vertex (or node). A connection between two 
vertices is called link (or edge, tie). The system of these vertices and links is a graph (or map). As links 
between two vertices are established when two directo s are sitting on the same board, Andy Hornby’s 
four directorships create connections with 38 directors. Besides Andy Hornby, HBOS and St. James's 
Place share two more directors: Dawson and Crosby. Jo Dawson was an executive director in HBOS and 
a non-executive director in St. James's Place. James Crosby was the CEO in HBOS before Andy Hornby. 
Similarly, GUS and Home Retail Group shared three dir ctors: Stocken, Coombe and Duddy. Oliver 
Stocken was a non-executive director in GUS and chairman of the board in Home Retail Group. John 
Coombe was a non-executive director in GUS and senior nonexecutive director in Home Retail Group. 
Terry was an executive director in GUS and the CEO in Home Retail Group. A sequence between two 
vertices, visiting no vertices more than once, is called a path. In the above graph, multiple paths exi t 
between John Peace and Richard Ashton. For example: Peace – Duddy – Ashton, Peace – Stocken – 
Ashton, Peace - Coombe – Hughes – Ashton and etc. The length of a path is the number of links it 
comprises and a geodesic path is the shortest path between two vertices (which is not necessarily unique). 
In the above example, both Peace – Duddy – Ashton and Peace – Stocken – Ashton are geodesic paths 
between Peace and Ashton.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3.2 Measures of Centrality 
In order to illustrate the calculation of various centrality measures, we construct a hypothetical 
network with six companies and ten directors. In Pael A and the figure of Appendix B, the numbers refe  
to firms and letters stand for directors. In order to compute the centrality measures, we record the network 
into a symmetric matrix, where 1 denotes a link betwe n the two directors (Panel B). This matrix enables 
us to calculate the centrality measures (Panel D). The degree and eigenvector centrality measures focu n 
direct (local) connections in order to assess the managerial influence. Measures of indirect connections 
such as closeness and betweenness are used to capture the information collection ability. 
The degree centrality of a vertex is calculated as the number of links held by that vertex. In the 
above example, the number of links – the degree centrality - for director a is 6. Panel A shows that 
director a is connected to 2 directors in company 3 and 4 directors in company 5. Note that since degree 
counts the connections between the CEO and the other board members in her company, this measure 
could be affected by factors influencing board size. However, as the board size in our sample does not 
differ much across firms, most of the variation in the degree measure is caused by the connections gaied 
from external directorships. 
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Eigenvector centrality of vertex v (CE(v)) is equal to the sum of all adjacent vertices’ 
eigenvector centrality scores:  
 
This calculation process begins with assigning score 1 to all the vertices. At each iteration, the 
score of vertex v is calculated as the sum of all adjacent vertices’ scores received in the previous iteration. 
In the above formula, matrix A is an n*n matrix with elements (v, j) and (j, v) equal to 1 if vertex j is 
adjacent to the target vertex v. Therefore, the centrality score for each vertex evolves after every iteration. 
The factor λ  is to make sure that the centrality scores converge rather than explode after many 
iterations. The advantage of eigenvector centrality over other centrality measures is that it not only 
captures how many vertices are linked to the target vertex (as degree centrality does), but also includes 
the centrality of those adjacent vertices. Hence, a vertex will have a higher eigenvector centrality score if 
it is connected to more vertices with higher centrality scores. 
The farness of a vertex is defined as the sum of geodesic distances between this vertex and all 
other vertices that can be reached. We transform the matrix of Panel B into the geodesic distance matrix 
by replacing all the zeros by the geodesic distance (Panel C). According to this definition, a higher fa ness 
value indicates that the vertex is further from other vertices. In order to define closeness (and normalized 










In this formula, the closeness centrality of vertex v (Cc(v)) is equal to one divided by the sum 
of the lengths of geodesic paths (dG) from v to any other vertex t. A high closeness value reflects the 
shorter distance to all other vertices, which suggests that the target vertex is more central in the network. 












A higher normalized closeness score implies a shorter distance to other vertices, in which case 
the CEO is able to acquire the information faster. The closeness measure is defined over all the conneted 
vertices in the graph (which entails that all isolated vertices do not have a closeness measure).  
 
The betweenness of vertex v is defined as the sum of its betweenness ratios. A betweenness 
ratio is the number of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t passing through vertex v, divided by the













therefore his betweenness score is zero. Geodesic paths between director c and all the other directors need 














where the denominator is the number of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t, the 
numerator is the number of geodesic paths from s to t with target vertex v on the geodesic paths. A high 
betweenness score of a CEO signifies that he has a ‘brokerage position’ between some otherwise 
separated groups. In the above example, director b would be the first person to know any information 
generated by director c. Such advantageous position is reflected in a high betweenness score.  
One may argue that direct connections bring in information as well. This is true but direct 
centrality measures may be inferior to indirect ones in terms of quantifying information collection 
efficiency. For instance, directors with numerous direct connections in an isolated corner of the whole 
network can hardly receive information as quickly as directors in the centre of the network (even with 
fewer direct connections). Moreover, as suggested by Granovetter (1973), information from direct 
connections is likely to be of lower quality than that from distant connections, because directly connected 
individuals tend to have redundant (similar) information sources. Therefore, the indirect centrality 
measures are better proxies of the information colle tion efficiency of a CEO’s network. Panel D in 
Appendix B presents the different centrality measure  for the directors in the above example. 
To calculate network centrality at the company level, each company is considered as a vertex 
in the graph and two companies are linked if they share at least one common director. Once the graph of 
the company level network is drawn, the centrality calculation proceeds similarly to that at the director 
level. More specifically, the degree centrality of a company is the number of other companies it connects 
to through director interlocks. The closeness of a company measures how close it is to all the other 
reachable companies.  
   
3.3 Sample Description: Director Networks 
The degree measure for an average UK CEO is 10 with the median value of 8 (Panel A, Table 
1). When we turn to the centrality scores of Andy Hornby, who has been the central director in the 
example shown in section 3.1, we find that he is much better connected than the average CEO in terms of 
direct links (38 direct links). It is safe to argue that the CEOs such as Andy Hornby with a large number 
of connections in adjacent companies have more managerial power on the board. However, a strong 
network based on direct links does not necessarily imply a strong position in the information collection 
networks. The normalized closeness measure for Andy Hornby is 0.05, which is slightly lower than the 
average and median level among the UK CEOs (0.054 and 0.052 respectively). Hence in this example, 
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although Andy Hornby is very active in networking, his network does not grant him better information 
collection ability. 
Over time, the level of connectedness decreases, pos ibly due to more strict regulation3 on the 
maximum number of directorships the CEO can hold. Table 1 also exhibits that the CEOs of the largest 
corporations are significantly better connected than t ose leading FT Small Caps or FT fledglings.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
We now turn to networks on the company level: the av r ge company has 4 interlocks with a 
median of 3 (Panel B, Table 1). All centrality measures indicate that the connectedness of British 
companies increased slightly at the beginning of our sample period (1996-1999), then remained stable 
until 2004 when a slight decline in the degree of cnnectedness commences. When we partition the 
sample companies according to size as reflected by index membership (FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 
Small Cap, and FTSE Fledging), we observe that larger firms have more direct links (degree) and are 
more closely related to other companies. The eigenvector centrality measure shows that FTSE 100 
companies are in more important network positions than FTSE 250 firms, Small Caps and Fledglings. 
Lastly, the betweenness measures indicate that larger fi ms are more likely to be on any geodesic path in 
the graph, which implies that they are occupying the important network junctions.  
The network differences between sectors are remarkable. On average, companies from the 
financial, IT, and medical sectors are more connected than the other sectors. However, networks have 
different structural features. In the financial sector, most companies are connected with each other within 
a large component (including 75 companies), and only a few smaller isolated coalitions exist (See Figure 
2a). In the IT industry (Figure 2b), companies are lik ly to be linked to other companies in their sector, 
but the networks are clustered in medium-sized components. Although the size of the subsample of IT 
firms is similar to that of the financial sector, the size of the largest component in the IT sector is nly one 
third of that in financial sector. Moreover, the network density and the average and the extreme values of 
centrality measures in the IT sector are very different from those in the financial sector. 
[Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
 
In the context of managerial compensation policies, it i  also interesting to study whether firms 
are connected by employing the same remuneration consultant. Those connections may imply that 
information on remuneration policies in other firms are more easily dissipated through the remuneration 
consultants’ networks of clients. Over the period 1996-2007, 145 to 198 remuneration consultants were 
                                                
3 The Higgs report (2003) requires that “the board should not agree to a full time executive director taking on more 
than one non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of such a company.” However, 
there are no direct limitations on the maximum number of directorships one can have. 
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active and we observe an increasing trend in the hiring of remuneration consultants. On average, a 
company is connected with more than 40 other companies through common remuneration advisors. 
 
4. Data and Methodology  
 
4.1 Estimation Methods 
As our estimation method, we prefer random effects GLS regressions over fixed effects 
models because our panel data include a large cross-section (with more than a thousand companies a 
year). In addition, the random effects model has higher estimation efficiency and is a weighted averag of 
between and within estimators. Lastly, the fixed effects model cannot estimate time-invariant variables, 
such as gender and position, which are important in our analysis. In virtually all model specifications, the 
explanatory variables are not correlated with the individual effects, as demonstrated by the Hausman test.  
We run the following two sets of regressions on:   
a. the level of the CEO’s total compensation 
CEO total compensation it = α + β1 × Performance measures it  
+ β2 × Network measures it  
+ β3 × CEO characteristics it 
+ β4 × Corporate governance measures it 
+ β5 × Ownership concentrationit 







γj, t × Industry j × Time t 
The network measure included is based on the director network function we intend to test 
(managerial influence versus information collection). We extend the analysis by replacing the above 
dependent variable by the compensation sub-categories such as salary, fees, bonus and equity-based 
compensation. The performance measures consist of accounting performance (return on assets) and a 
stock performance measure (market-adjusted return). CEO characteristics include the CEO’s gender, 
tenure, age, membership in committees (audit, nominatio  and remuneration), and the combination of the 
positions of CEO and chairman of the board. Board structure variables are important internal corporate 
governance controls. Ownership concentration consists of the percentage of block holdings by category 
of shareholder. We categorize all the share stakes held by directors and all the blocks of 3% or more into
the various shareholder categories that are discussed in Section 4.5. Lastly, we include some firm 
characteristics such as size, capital structure, and stock price volatility. All regressions also include 
industry and time dummy variables. 
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b. The pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation 
Change in CEO compensation it = α + β1 × Performance measure it  
+ β2 × Network measure it  
+ β3 × Network measure it × Performance measure it 
+ β4 × CEO characteristics it 
+ β5 × Corporate governance variables it 
+ β6 × Ownership concentration it 







γj, t × Industry j × Time t 
In the above pay-for-performance sensitivity regression, the change in total compensation or 
subcategory of compensation is the dependent variable.  
 
An analysis of remuneration contracting should also be related to the examination of CEO 
departure and dismissal because disregarding the CEO turnover decision may cause sample selection 
problems in the remuneration analysis (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2010). When the analysis of 
changes in compensation only includes ‘surviving’ CEOs, the sample distribution is restricted which may 
lead to estimation biases. In order to study the compensation and turnover decisions simultaneously, we 
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where { }itit 21  ,εε  are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0, variances 21σ  
and 22σ , and covariance 12σ  (Amemiya, 1984). 1β  and 2β  are vectors of the model coefficients. In 
our models, i corresponds to a firm and t to a year. *itTurnover  and 
*
itonCompensati  are underlying 
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latent variables that are not observable. However, th  sign of the *itTurnover  variable can be observed 
and coded as a binary variable CEO_stayedit: if a CEO loses his or her job (i.e., 0
* ≤itSurvival ) it is 
coded as 0, otherwise it is coded as 1. Obviously, compensation is only observed for CEOs who are not 
dismissed. it1Χ  and it2Χ  are the sets of explanatory variables explaining CEO turnover and 
compensation, respectively. They include the measurs enumerated above. The two sets of explanatory 
variables, i.e., itX1  and itX2 , are not disjoint (they can differ, however).  
Throughout the paper, we call Equation (1) the selection equation, while Equation (2) is the 
regression equation. The selection equation explains CEO turnover, i.e., 1_ =itstayedCEO  
corresponds to those firm-years when the CEO keeps his or her position. The regression equation explains 
the compensation of these CEOs in the subsequent year. As the notion of compensation sensitivity to 
performance is not meaningful for new CEOs, we restrict the remuneration analysis to CEOs with tenure 
of more than one year. Estimating the parameters of Equation (2) on the basis of the non-turnover sample 
only, would not be a valid alternative to the proposed method because the OLS estimator of 2β  is 
biased when the selection of the regression sample is endogenous (i.e., 012 ≠σ ). 
 
4.2 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
The dataset comprises information on 1,758 companies4 for which we have 9,789 firm-years 
with CEOs, 13,854 firm-years with CEOs and CEO-equivalents5 and 121,825 firm-years with all 
directors. All sample companies are listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Virtually all companies 
belong to one of these indices: FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE Small Cap, FTSE Fledgling, and FTSE AIM. 
6 The FTSE 350 comprises both the FTSE 100 (the 100 biggest companies that represent about 81% of 
the market capitalization) and the FTSE 250 (the next 250 largest companies with about 15% of the UK 
market). FTSE Small Cap includes companies that are relatively small, and cover about 2% of the total 
LSE market value. We have info on virtually the complete UK market. This fact is important in the 
context of network research as limiting the sample siz  to e.g. FTSE 350 only would give a distorted 
picture of the networks existing in UK listed firms.   
We collect the remuneration data as well as detailed board information from BoardEx, 
Manifest, and annual reports. Other company-specific data including sector categorization, accounting 
information (profit measures, capital structure, and firm size), stock performance and volatility are 
                                                
4 Note that in some regressions, we only include 1,216 firms because indirect centrality measures cannot be 
calculated for isolated firms.    
5 Details about identifying CEO equivalents can be found in Appendix B.  
6 FTSE All-Share can be seen as the aggregation of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap Indices. It 
represents 98-99% of the UK market capitalization. FTSE AIM overlaps to some extent with FTSE Fledglin. 
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gathered from Datastream Advance. Ownership data is provided by Thomson Financial and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Our dataset starts in 1996 (after the release of the Greenbury Report on 
Managerial Compensation in 1995) and ends in 2007. 
In case the length of the financial year deviates from 365/366 days (it is then more than 30 
days longer or shorter than 365), the remuneration nd accounting information are adjusted accordingly to 
make sure they are comparable to other annual values. When a financial year is not coinciding with the
calendar year, we apply this rule: e.g. we regard a financial year ending between January and June 31st 
2005 as the year 2004 whereas we consider a financial year ending between 1st July and 31st of December 
2005 as the year 2005.  
 
4.3 Remuneration Data 
The total remuneration package of a director can be dissected into these sub-categories: (i) 
salary, (ii) fee, (iii) bonus, (iii) equity-based compensation (stock options and long term incentive plans), 
(v) miscellaneous remuneration, and (vi) other. Thesalary includes a fixed payment and is usually paid 
out in cash (and exceptionally in shares). Fees are usually paid for consulting and supervisory servic s 
rather than for operational work and are hence more often compensation for non-executive directors or 
former executive directors. The bonus can consist of cash or shares and is usually paid when specific 
benchmarks or targets were reached over the past yer (or past few years). Bonuses can also be 
voluntarily deferred or are compulsorily deferred for a vesting period of usually three years. In practice, 
the initial cash deferral bonus is often converted into stock at favourable terms if the CEO commits to 
remain in his company or meets some performance crit ria over the vesting period. A deferred bonus 
realized in stock is recorded as restricted stock and categorized as equity-based compensation.7  
Equity-based compensation includes r tricted shares and stock options. Restricted shares are 
granted under different schemes such as shares appreciation rights and deferred bonus schemes. In most
circumstances, the restricted shares cannot be sold until certain goals are reached and before the vesting 
period. Restricted shares are valued at the market p ice of the grant date. The market price at grant d te 
was collected from Datastream Advance. Stock options give the CEOs the right to acquire company 
stocks at a predetermined price (exercise price). Stock options in the executive remuneration packages in 
the UK have often vesting conditions (performance benchmarks) and always vesting periods, typically 
three to five years. We approximate the value of the stock options by means of the Black-Scholes option 
pricing formula. Most options are granted at the money; the market price and stock price volatility at the 
grant date are collected from Datastream Advance. As we lack information about the time to maturity of 
                                                
7 We include the deferred bonus plans in cash terms at the grant date. All performance related sub-categori s are 
recorded and valued at the grant date. 
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stock options, we use ten years (the usual time to expiration at the grant date) as the default maturity for 
all stock option value calculations. The interest rate of 10-year UK government bonds (Gilts) is used as 
the risk-free rate.  
Miscellaneous compensation includes compensation that is not paid out on a regular basis, and 
includes transaction bonuses, recruitment incentives, relocation expenses, and loss of office 
compensation. A transaction bonus is granted when the CEO has administered major corporate 
transactions, such as takeovers, or other types of asset restructuring. A deferred cash bonus (different 
from the deferred bonus defined above) is granted mainly with the aim of retaining the CEO. For 
instance, the CEO needs to remain employed for the vesting period (typically 3-5 years) in order to claim 
this cash award (which is not performance-related). The recruitment incentive is paid when a position is 
difficult to fill without such an additional allurement and is associated only with new appointments. 
Relocation expenses are awarded in case the newly-appointed CEO needs to move nearer to his new firm. 
The loss of office compensation is also known as severance pay (or a golden parachute). When the 
contract is terminated before it expires, the CEO is compensated for this early departure. The payment of 
the severance pay is often not contractually specified and is granted even when the CEO is fired following 
poor performance. Our dataset also contains a remunration category labelled ‘Other’, which is rare and 
includes all forms of compensation and benefits that are not included in any of the above categories. It 
consists of the CEO’s (medical) insurance paid for by the firm, some ‘ad hoc benefits’ or ‘unusual 
compensation’ about which the firms do not give detail d information. We also have information about 
pension contributions done by the company for the benefit of executive directors. Given that this 
information is not complete, we do not include its value in the CEO’s compensation. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on remuneration for the whole sample period. The most 
important components of a CEO’s compensation package in the UK are equity-based compensation 
(restricted shares and stock options), fixed salary, nd bonus. On average, ₤ 296,215 is paid to a CEO 
each year as equity-based compensation, which accounts for 44.8% of his total remuneration. The salary 
on average amounts to ₤ 202,931 or 30.70% of the total remuneration. The bonus is also a significant 
source for a CEO’s wealth accumulation with an averg  of ₤ 126,290 or 19.11% of the total 
compensation. The remaining compensation components such as fees, miscellaneous compensation and 
other are only marginal and add up to a mere 5% of CEO compensation.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
How did the value of compensation packages evolve? Figure 3 shows a strong increase in the 
total remuneration which peaked in the year 2000 (following the strong stock market boom of the 1990s), 
was followed by a short-lived decrease in 2001-2002 (coinciding with the equity market decline and the
collapse of the M&A market) and then kept rising till 2007. By 2007, the total remuneration for the CEO 
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had almost doubled relative to 1996. Over the entir sample period, the total remuneration increased at an
average rate of 9.43% per annum. There are only modest increases in the fixed salary over time, but the 
augmentation of the bonus and equity-based compensatio  re striking. Particularly in 2000, when the 
stock market peaked before the bursting of the high tec  bubble, the equity-based compensation also 
became the most valuable aspect of a compensation package (amounting to 53.04% of the total 
remuneration). Moreover, if we look across the industries, the distribution of CEO compensation is highly 
skewed: a small number of well paid CEOs (mostly from FTSE 350) have driven up the average CEO 
compensation in the UK market. Lastly, equity-based compensation is still a smaller part of total 
remuneration of UK CEOs than that of US CEOs. In 2007, CEOs of S&P 500 companies were on average 
paid a total compensation of USD 13.4 million whereas UK CEOs of FTSE 100 companies received ₤ 4.3 
million (USD 8.6 million).  
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
We find that the companies in the industries of Financial Services, Food Producing, Media, 
and Utilities reward their CEOs the most. The highest paid CEO in 2007 was Bart Becht from the Reckitt 
Benckiser Group with a compensation of ₤ 31 million, followed by Terence Leahy from Tesco’s earning 
₤ 21 million. For each of these CEOs (and most other top earners), more than 80% of their remuneration 
packages consist of equity-based compensation. 
Partitioning the sample firms based on membership of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE Small 
Cap and FTSE Fledgling, we find that the CEO remuneration of the largest firms (FTSE 100) is about 10, 
5 and 2.5 times larger than that of the Fledglings, Small Caps and FTSE 250 firms, respectively. The 
growth in nominal salaries for the CEOs leading Fledg ings is 9.84% per annum. The growth is stronger 
at about 19.5% annually for small caps and FTSE 250 firms, and 15.3% for the largest firms (FTSE 100). 
The structure of the compensation packages in largecompanies is markedly different from that of smaller 
firms. The bonus, restricted shares, and stock options make up a larger proportion (up to 70%) of the total 
executive directors’ compensation of the largest companies (FTSE 350). In the FTSE Small Cap and 
FTSE Fledgling companies, the proportion of the performance-related compensation is less than 60% and 
40%, respectively.  
 
4.4 CEO, Board, and Firm Characteristics  
The CEOs’ average age is about 53 years. While this average age remains relatively stable 
over time, the average tenure declines from 8.7 years in 1996 to 4.9 years in 2007. Executive directors are 
somewhat younger than the nonexecutive directors; they are 50 and 58 years, respectively. The age and 
trend in tenure also persist in firms of different sizes and sectors - only the CEOs in the largest companies 
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have a shorter tenure. The vast majority of the CEOs is still male, although the proportion of female 
CEOs has slightly increased over time (from 0.8% in 1996 to 2.6% in 2007).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Across our sample period, CEO turnover amounts to 23.75% which includes 1.1% turnover 
resulting from the decease of CEOs and 12.25% from retirements.8 We also collect information on the 
CEOs’ contracts such as the notice periods. More than ree quarters of the companies (77%) are required 
to inform the CEO twelve months prior to the dismissal. For about 12%, the notice period is longer than 
20 months.  
On average, the board consists of 8 directors of which 5 are non-executives (Table 4, Panel A). 
Merely 4% of the board members are female. In 13.1% of the firm-years, the CEO also chairs the board 
of directors. This high number is surprising given that board duality can harm the board’s supervisory 
power and that the UK Corporate Governance Code discourages board duality. There is however a 
significant decline in board duality over time: in 1996, 21.0% of the CEOs had also assumed the tasks of 
chairman but this number dropped to 7.0% by 2007.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code also requires that a firm has audit, nomination, and 
remuneration committees. In the context of the functio ing and independence of these committees, it is 
important to note that these committees should be staffed mainly by non-executive directors. Most 
companies, with the exception of a fraction of the very small firms, comply with the UK code and have 
audit (98%) and remuneration committees (88%). In more than 80% of all firm-years, there is a 
nomination committee (Table 4, Panel B). Panel C demonstrates that at least one executive director 
participates in the decision making of the nomination committee in more than half (53.5%) of the 
firm-years. The presence of executive directors on the remuneration committee is also remarkable. 
Conditional on the presence of a remuneration committee, at least one executive director is a member of 
the committee in one out of five firm-years. In Panel D, we examine the extent to which CEOs are present 
in the committees. Nomination committees have often been criticized for not being sufficiently 
independent from the CEO as he could influence the appointments of non-executive directors who are 
unlikely to oppose his views and to monitor the executive directors actively. In about 44% of the 
firm-years, the CEO is a member of the nomination cmmittee which he chairs in 11.5% of the cases. 
CEO membership of the remuneration committee creates obvious conflicts of interest, and Panel D 
                                                
8 The retirement turnover comprises the departure of CEOs who are 63 years old or above. Given that the true 
reason behind the turnover is not available – most firms use euphemistic terms to describe the CEO’s departure - we 
do not distinguish between voluntary turnover and disciplinary turnover for the non-retirement cases. 
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exhibits that the CEO is a member of the remuneration committee in 10% of the firm-years and even 
chairs this committee in 2% of the cases. CEOs’ committee membership linearly decreases with company 
size, but the CEO is still a member of the remuneration committee in about 2.5% of the firm-years in 
FTSE 100 firms and in 7% of FTSE 250 firms. 
Remuneration committees frequently hire remuneration c nsultants (42% of all companies in 
2007) and report who their main consultant is in the annual report. The most frequently hired 
remuneration consultant is New Bridge Street Consultants (hired by 15.3% of the firms), followed by 
Towers Perrin (5.8%), and Deloitte and Touche (4.9%)  Of the listed companies, 22.8% report that they 
only use internal advice to set managerial pay.   
 
4.5 Insider and Outsider Ownership Concentration 
We categorize all the share stakes held by directors and all the blocks of 3% or more into the 
following shareholder categories: (i) investment and mutual funds, (ii) insurance companies, (iii) pensio  
funds, (iv) banks, (v) nominees accounts, (vi) individuals and families not related to a director, (vii) 
industrial and commercial companies, (viii) CEO, (ix) executive directors (excluding the CEO)s and (x) 
non-executive directors. Categories (i) to (iv) constitute the institutional investors9, and classes (viii) to 
(x) make up the insider ownership. Table 5 exhibits that the ownership concentration is rather stable over
time and fluctuates around 35%. Insider ownership amounts to about 7% over the whole sample period. 
Relative to other countries (the US and Continental Europe) where executive directors rarely hold a 
combined share stake of more than 0.5% in listed companies, executive ownership in the UK is high with 
an average of almost 4.7% of the equity that gives th  insiders significant voting power. The average 
CEO holds 2.5% of the market capitalization. From 1998 to 2001, an upward trend in insider ownership 
concentration is visible, partly caused by an increase in the use of equity-based compensation for the top 
management. In the subsequent period, the combined i si er stakes stabilize around 6.8%. The 
shareholder category with the highest ownership concentration is the investment funds which on average 
hold almost 14.7% of the equity. The investment funds’ share stake has increased gradually over the 
sample period from 8.5% in 1999 to 17.5% in 2007. The ownership concentration held by banks and 
pension funds has remained relatively stable over time. All the institutional shareholder classes combined 
control around 20.7% of the concentrated voting rights. The combined equity stakes of industrial and 
commercial corporations amounts to almost 8%.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 
                                                





5.1 Compensation and Director Network Centrality 
 
Total compensation and its components 
In Table 6, we estimate the impact of director networks on the CEOs’ total annual 
compensation. The degree centrality at the individual director (CEO) level (Degree (D)) is positively 
correlated with the CEO’s total compensation. This implies that CEOs with a strong network based on 
direct connections have higher compensation. When w replace degree by a second measure of direct 
networks at the director level, namely by the eigenvector centrality of the network, we reach similar 
results (not shown).  
We also investigate the relation between networks based on indirect connections (the closeness 
level) which proxies for the information-value of the network, and CEO remuneration. Normalized 
closeness (nCloseness (D)) indeed significantly boosts CEO compensation. This implies that a CEO’s 
network resources are valuable to and rewarded by the company. The correlation between direct and 
indirect centrality measures such as degree and normalized closeness is very small (0.18). When we 
include both measures in one model, both remain strongly statistically significant. This evidence suggests 
that both the managerial influence hypothesis (Hypothesis 1 - influential CEOs extract higher 
compensation) and the information-value hypothesis (Hypothesis 2 -CEOs with valuable information 
networks extract higher compensation) are upheld. We find that the direct links explain twice as much of 
the variation in the total CEO remuneration than do the indirect links, which implies that managerial 
influence hypothesis is more strongly supported. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
We now turn to the centrality measures at the company level. The degree of a company shows 
how many boards are interlocked with its own board. Company degree (Degree (C), column (2) of Table 
6) has a significantly positive impact on the CEO’s total compensation. A high degree at the company 
level signifies that the board members are active in many other companies as executive or non-executive 
directors, which implies that these directors divert some of their time and energy. The probability of 
collusion may also increase with the number of board interlocks. When a board is more interlocked, 
corporate governance may become less effective, and as a possible consequence, the CEO may be able to 
extract higher compensation. So, our findings fail to reject hypothesis 3 (busy boards/managerial 
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influence).10 In column (4) of Table 6, we evaluate the impact of cl seness (nCloseness (C)) at the 
company level, namely the information collection ability of all directors collectively. We find a negative 
correlation between CEO remuneration and company closeness which signifies that, when a firm has 
many indirect links, it depends less on the CEO’s individual network to attract valuable information ad 
resources. Hence, the firm can afford to pay out a lower total compensation to the CEO, which supports 
hypothesis 4.  
While centrality measures are related to total compensation, we also investigate whether they 
have a different impact on the various components of pay (not shown). In the fixed salary model, we find 
that our earlier results are upheld: the CEO’s direct n twork (degree (D)) yields a higher fixed salary nd 
so does the company’s direct network (Degree (C)). We also find that indirect networks are valued in 
monetary terms given the positive correlation with fixed salary. In contrast, the CEO’s fixed salary does 
not decrease when the company’s information collection ability through the combined director network is 
high. We reach similar conclusions on the relation between direct networks, and the bonus and 
equity-based compensation. These two sub-categories f compensation increase with the degree at both 
the individual and the company level. Also, the closeness measure for individual CEO networks is 
positively correlated with the CEO’s bonus and equity-based pay. Yet, the closeness on the company 
level limits these aspects of pay. So, it seems that a well-connected company that relies less on the CEO’s 
network, pays lower bonuses and equity-based compensatio . We do not find any impact of networks on 
fees and other types of compensation not included in the above categories.  
To sum up, a CEO’s network increases his compensation through two channels. In line with 
the managerial influence hypothesis, the CEO’s direct links grant him more authority over the board. We
also find evidence that if the CEO has a network valuable for information collection, his compensation 
increases accordingly. This is in line with the information collection hypothesis: a company rewards the 
CEO for the resources he contributes to the firm through his network. When we study the director 
networks at the company level, the managerial influence/busy board hypothesis and information 
collection hypothesis make different predictions. More specifically, we measure the direct links from the
company to all ‘adjacent’ companies and the indirect links from the company to all companies in the 
population. The direct centrality (degree) has a positive correlation with CEO total compensation and its 
components. This result suggests that when there ar m ny direct interlocks of board members (busy 
boards), corporate governance effectiveness may be weaker which can result in higher CEO 
compensation. A higher closeness at the firm level lowers CEO compensation because the board as a 
whole may now be better informed and hence relies les on the CEO’s network. The CEO is then paid 
                                                
10 In section 6.6, we try to disentangle the manageril influence and busy board hypothesis at the company level by 
only considering company networks based on the external networks of non-executive directors and those based on 
executive directors’ external networks. Both the busy board and managerial power hypotheses at the company level 
are supported.  
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less. These two results demonstrate that it is important to have the ‘right’ type of network, which deliv rs 
valuable information rather than managerial influence.  
Our results are not only statistically significant, but also economically. Considering a one 
standard deviation change in the centrality measures, w  find that the degree measures at the individual 
level and company level have a large influence (9% and 15%, respectively) on the CEO’s total 
compensation. The information value related measures have a smaller impact: a one standard deviation 
increase in closeness (better individual information access) raises the total compensation by 4%. 
Closeness at the company level reduces total CEO compensation by about 4%. In short, networks that 
enhance managerial influence have a larger impact th n information-collection networks.  
 
Pay-for-performance sensitivity 
The pay-for-performance sensitivity is captured by performance and the interaction term 
between networks and performance (in Table 7). When t  number of direct connections increases, the 
change in total compensation becomes less sensitive to stock performance (column 1). This supports the 
managerial influence hypothesis as we show that the stock performance sensitivity declines for this type 
of CEOs. We do not find any evidence of accounting performance sensitivity.  
When the degree at the company level is high we also find a lower performance-sensitivity of 
CEO remuneration (column 2). A higher degree at the company level signifies that all the directors 
combined have direct links with many other companies. This implies that the executive directors may be 
more powerful but also that the non-executive directors exert duties in other firms which may erode thir 
corporate governance effectiveness (busy board hypot esis).  
The information collection aspect of the director networks (the closeness measure for the CEO) 
has no significant impact on the pay-for-performance sensitivity of his remuneration. This implies that a 
stronger director network position for the purpose of information collection is not translated into a 
stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity. When we consider closeness on the company level, we observe 
less accounting performance-sensitivity, which fails to support hypothesis 4. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
In our models, we have also included the firms’ networks resulting from the connections of 
their remuneration consultants. This measure can also capture firms’ information gathering abilities. The 
firm then benefits from information on the remuneration practices of the consultant’s clients. The 
estimated network coefficient of the remuneration csultant is positive and significant, implying that 
companies associated with a remuneration consultant with a large client network pay their CEOs more. 
The interaction term of firm size with consultant network size is also significantly positive which signifies 
that bigger firms employing larger remuneration consultants grant their CEOs a larger total compensation.  
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5.2 Other Determinants of CEO Compensation 
We have controlled the models in Tables 6 and 7 for corporate performance, company size, 
CEO characteristics, and corporate governance variables such as ownership concentration and board 
composition.  
Both accounting and stock price performance have a significantly positive impact on total 
compensation. In the pay-for-performance analysis, the change in total compensation is more sensitive to 
stock performance than accounting performance. When w  examine the changes in the components of 
compensation, we find that salary is more sensitive to accounting performance than to stock performance 
(not shown). Performance-related compensation including bonus and equity-based compensation is 
significantly positively influenced by both accounting and stock performance.  
The debt to assets ratio is positively related to CEO compensation, which suggests that 
companies with high gearing (some of which may be financially distressed) need to attract or maintain 
CEOs at higher cost. CEO remuneration decreases with stock price volatility, which is somewhat 
counterintuitive. We would expect that a CEO be better compensated in risky firms which may be more 
difficult to manage or that he demand a larger equity-based compensation package. A possible 
explanation for this result is that the company offers more fixed compensation as the performance signal 
that determines the variable compensation contains oo much noise.  
We also investigate the impact of CEO characteristics on CEO remuneration. Contrary to 
some of the gender literature, we do not find any difference between the compensation of male and 
female CEOs, which may be the result of including other control variables such as tenure, age, industry, 
and corporate size. Not surprisingly, a CEO’s compensation increases with tenure. Combining the 
function of CEO with the tasks of the chairman seems to decrease his salary. However, further 
investigation reveals that the combination of both functions is almost exclusive to small companies where 
the CEO compensation is lower. When we add the interac ion term between the CEO-chairman duality 
and total assets, we notice that a CEO earns more if he is also the chairman. We also include a dummy 
variable that equals one if the CEO is a member of one of the committees (audit, nomination and 
remuneration), as such memberships augment his influence. The results confirm that committee 
memberships yield a larger compensation. When we include the membership of only the remuneration 
committee, we find clear evidence that conflicts of interests prevail because the CEO’s total compensation 
is now higher. Lastly, the notice period of the CEO is not related to his pay. 
Board characteristics include the proportion of nonexecutive directors and of female directors 
on the board. In most models, both ratios are positively correlated with CEO total compensation. Contrary 
to the US results of Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), our finding suggests that non-executive directors 
in the UK are lenient in setting CEO compensation. This may result from the fact that non-executive 
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directors are executives in other firms and raising the pay in one firm can have a spill-over effect on the 
compensation policy of their own firm. 
The last set of control variables consist of the ownership variables. Among the three insider 
ownership categories, the CEO’s stock holdings is the only factor that significantly influences total 
compensation. Intuitively, as the CEO acquires a larger share stake in his company, a larger fraction of his 
wealth is tied to corporate performance such that he may be less incentivized by remuneration. We also
find that non-executive shareholders are not more effective supervisors. As for the outsider ownership, 
only block holdings held by individuals or families not related to a director and the share stakes held 
through nominee accounts reduce a CEO’s compensatio. These findings provide some evidence that 
outsider blockholders may curb excessive compensation, but industrial block holdings are not related to 
the level of compensation. If large share stakes ar owned by institutions (bank, investment fund, pensio  
and insurance company), the total CEO compensation is high. This is congruent with the fact that most 
institutional shareholders in the UK are passive monitors.  
 
6. Further Analysis and Robustness Checks 
 
6.1 Endogeneity 
Possible criticism on the above models is that there could be one common factor which 
contributes to both high compensation and strong network connections. For example, a successful CEO 
who is well compensated attracts non-executive directo ships because he has a good track record (good 
past performance). Therefore, we apply an instrumental variable approach with board size and the CEO’s 
honorary title as the instrumental variables for the centrality measures at the individual director (CEO) 
level. The outcome confirms our earlier results in that it corroborates the managerial influence hypotheses 
as high CEO degree measures boost total compensatio. Similarly, at the company level, the model with 
instrumental variables generates a similar conclusion as the one implied by the random effects models: 
high degree measures on the company levels (proxying both for executive power and busy boards) lead to 
higher CEO compensation. We do not find a significant impact of the closeness measures which capture 
the information collection value of a network. We also run a regression with individual CEO fixed effects, 
but reach the same conclusion: the relations between n twork centrality and compensation persist.  
 
6.2 Heckman Sample Selection Equation 
In most of the academic literature on compensation and turnover, the compensation and 
dismissal are examined separately. However, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2010) point out that 
disregarding CEO turnover in remuneration research causes sample selection problems. In order to take 
into account the information of new and old CEO contracts, we employ Heckman sample selection 
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equations to study turnover (the selection equation) a d compensation (the regression equation) 
simultaneously. Table 8 shows that the type-2 Tobit model yields virtually the same results as those 
resulting from the random effects models.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
6.3 Other Centrality Measures 
Besides the degree and closeness measures, we use addition l network statistics to estimate the 
strength of networks based on direct and indirect links. We run the regression models with eigenvector 
centrality and the betweenness measures (see Section 3.1) as substitutes for degree and closeness, 
respectively. Both normalized eigenvector centrality and normalized betweenness at the director level are 
significantly positively correlated to total compensation, which is in line with our findings for degre and 
closeness. At the company level we find that, while th  eigenvector centrality estimates are congruent 
with those for degree, the betweenness measure yields different results than closeness. Although the 
betweenness measure is defined very differently from degree, the correlation in this sample between 
betweenness and degree is high. 
 
We also re-estimate our models implementing the following changes:  
- Outward degree 
We mentioned in the previous section that the degree m asure on the individual level could be 
affected by board size. In order to resolve this problem, we create a degree variable that is only based on 
‘outward’ connections to other firms (and thus excludes the connections to the directors of the own 
company). When we include the outward degree measur, we draw the same conclusion as before for the 
analysis of total compensation: the CEO’s outward degree significantly increases the total compensation. 
We also find evidence of a negative impact of outward degree on the stock price performance sensitivity 
of CEO remuneration. This suggests that it is mainly the outward direct connections that play an 
important role in the pay-setting process. 
 
- Zero closeness for isolated companies 
In the company level networks, the closeness centrality for isolated companies is not defined. 
An alterative approach is to put these missing closene s scores to zero in order to include these firms in 
the closeness analysis. Intuitively, the distances from these companies to others are considered as infinity 
such that closeness, which is the inverse of total distance, becomes zero. Applying this new definitio of 
closeness, we obtain the opposite result: namely, the closeness measure at company level increases the 
CEO total compensation. The main reason for this result is that isolated companies are usually small with
low CEO compensation.  
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- Error terms as indirect centrality measures 
We have discussed in Section 2 that direct and indirect connections are not exclusive and can 
in some cases be complementary. In order to disentangle the effect of direct and indirect connections, we 
adjust the centrality measures. We first run regression  with closeness as the dependent variable on the 
degree centrality measure. The error term of this regression is the part of indirect centrality that cnnot be 
explained by the direct centrality. When we include this orthogonal indirect measure into the total 
remuneration regression, we find that this indirect measure (at the individual level) increases the CEO’s 
total compensation. This finding is in line with our earlier evidence based on closeness as an indirect 
centrality measure. Thus, our orthogonal measure at the director level also supports hypothesis 2.  
In contrast, the orthogonal measure of indirect closeness at the company level does not lower 
CEO compensation, which differs from the prediction f hypothesis 4. In the pay-for-performance 
analysis, we expect that better information access at the company level can improve the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation (hypothesis 4), but we do not find evidence 
supporting this prediction when using the orthogonal i direct centrality measure. 
 
- Change in centrality measures 
We investigate whether the change in the centrality measures affects the total compensation or 
pay-for-performance sensitivity, but do not find any statistical evidence for the relation between change in 
centrality and total compensation or pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
 
6.4 Restricted Shares and Stock Options 
In the above analysis, we have combined restricted s ock (LTIPs) and stock options into a 
variable capturing the equity-based compensation. However, these two types of equity-based 
compensation have different characteristics in terms of risk and incentives. As stock options reward the 
owner in case of stock price appreciation but have a lower bound at zero in case the stock price drops, 
managers are incentivised to undertake riskier operations. Typically, stock options induce more 
risk-taking behaviour relative to restricted shares (Murphy, 1999). We use each type of equity-based 
compensation as the dependent variable. The level of stock options granted to the CEO increases with 
degree both at the individual and company level. This result is in line with our earlier results on total 
compensation and our expectations as formulated by hypotheses 1 and 3. The fact that closeness is not 
related to option compensation at both the individual and company level contradicts hypotheses 2 and 4.  
Fewer restricted shares are granted to the CEO when closeness at the company is higher, 
which is in line with the result from the baseline model and hypothesis 4. Other centrality measures (e.g., 
degree at individual and company level and closeness at individual level) are not related to restricted 
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shares. In the pay-for-performance analysis, we find that compensation via stock options is less sensitive 
to performance changes if the CEO has a higher degree centrality score. This supports the managerial 
influence hypothesis (hypothesis 1). 
 
6.5 Extended Pay-for-performance Sensitivity  
While in the previous section, we have analyzed the total pay-for-performance sensitivity, we 
also examine the change in performance-related compensation (the sum of bonus and equity-based pay) to 
estimate the sensitivity. Our results are similar to those shown above. We also replace the level of 
performance in the sensitivity regression by the change in performance. This model yields results which 
are largely similar to the ones reported in Section 5.1. When we estimate models with the percentage 
changes in total compensation and performance, we obtain similar conclusions as in section 5.1, although 
with lower significance.   
The relation between pay and performance is likely to be non-linear. Powerful CEOs prefer 
their pay to be performance-sensitive when performance increases, but not be sensitive in case of 
declining performance. We therefore run our regression  on the sub-samples of positive and negative 
performance changes, but find no significant difference between networks’ impact in the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity in the two sub-samples. 
 
6.6 Busy director measure 
In section 5.1, we have used direct centrality measures at the company level to assess whether  
a board can be considered as ‘busy’. Alternatively, we can consider directors with more than one 
directorship as busy directors and use the proportion of busy directors on board as a measure of busy 
board. On average, there are three busy directors on a board, occupying 29% board seats and 17% of the 
CEOs are busy directors. We find that the number and proportion of busy directors on the board have a 
significant positive impact on the CEO’s total compensation.  
 
6.7 Institutional Ownership Classification 
We partition the category of institutional investor into more detailed shareholder classes in 
order to investigate which types of institutions are able to more effectively influence CEO pay. The 
results reveal that pension funds are able to restrain CEO compensation whereas the presence of blocks 
held by other classes of financial institutions does either have no or a positive effect on CEO pay. 
 
6.8 Other Sample Specifications 
New and old contracts 
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In the sample selection models, we have focused on on-going CEO contracts, but the 
compensation-centrality relation of a new CEO may be different from that of ongoing contracts. The 
compensation of the new CEO does not hinge on the past performance of his new firm (but his initial 
compensation may reflect his performance in his old firm). The first-year contract typically includes more 
extraordinary compensation components such as a sign-on bonus or relocation fee. These elements may 
be less relevant to the network-compensation relation. For both the models applied to the new and the 
on-going contracts separately, we find very similar results as the ones shown in Section 5 (except that he 
company level closeness measure loses its significace for new contracts). 
 
Excluding financial companies 
The current sample includes all UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(including the ones listed on the Alternative Investment Market). We have also included financial 
companies in the network calculations as some bankers also belong to the director networks of industrial 
and commercial companies. Given that financial companies have a different asset structure and comply 
with different regulatory requirements than firms from other sectors, we re-estimate our results excluding 
financial firms, although that the director network measures are still calculated based on the network 
including all companies. We find that our earlier rsults are still upheld and hence do not depend on the 
financial sector.  
   
CEO and CEO equivalents 
Some companies do not have an executive director bearing the title of CEO. These companies 
are usually small and led by managing directors or other senior executives. We did not include these 
‘CEO equivalent’ managers in our main regression. As a robustness check, we run the regressions on the 
sample including both the CEOs and the CEO equivalents. The results from this larger sample are quite 




We have examined the relation between directors’ networks, and CEOs’ compensation and 
pay-for-performance. Specifically, we distinguish between two functions of networks: the accumulation 
of managerial influence and the collection of valuab e information. The former implies that powerful 
CEOs may take advantage of their position to extract benefits such as a higher compensation at a 
significant cost to the shareholders. The latter function of information collection can be beneficial to the 
company (and the director). Although the existing literature does not make this distinction, we empirically 
differentiate network centrality measures at the direct and indirect level. Strong direct networks 
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(measured by degree and eigenvector centrality) proxy for managerial influence, whereas strong indirect 
networks (measured by closeness and betweenness) can capture information-collection ability. We find 
that both strong direct and indirect networks are rewarded with a higher compensation (fixed salary, 
bonus, and equity-based compensation). When we examine the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO 
compensation, we find that a high direct centrality measure decreases the pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
The combination of high CEO compensation and low pay-for-performance corroborates the managerial 
influence hypothesis. While the information value of indirect networks is reflected in higher CEO 
compensation, it does not influence the pay-for-performance relation.  
When we study director networks at the company level, w  find that strong direct company 
networks are correlated with higher compensation and lower pay-for-performance sensitivity. This 
finding is in line with the managerial influence hypothesis and the busy board hypothesis because in 
companies with a high number of direct links, the ex cutive and non-executive directors may exert too 
many duties outside their company such that they divert too much of their time and are less effective 
monitors. This may then be reflected in high CEO compensation with low pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
Closeness at the company level lowers CEO compensatio  because the board is better informed and relies 
less on the CEO’s network. Taken together, these two results suggest that it is important to have the 
‘right’ type of network: some networks enable a firm to access valuable information whereas others can 
lead to strong managerial influence that may come at the detriment of the firm and its shareholders. 
In this study on centrality-CEO compensation relation, we have controlled for many CEO, 
board, and company characteristics. For instance, our empirical findings confirm that conflicts of interest 
emerge when a CEO is a member of the remuneration committee. In this case his compensation is 
significantly higher. We also document that remuneration consultants influence CEO compensation. 
When a firm hires a remuneration consultant with a large client network, CEO compensation is 
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Figure 1. Example of a CEO’s professional network  
This Figure depicts the director networks surrounding Andy Hornby (white circle in the middle of the graph). 
Directors in the four companies served by Andy Hornby are represented as circles in different shades. In this figure, 
each circle stands for a vertex (director) in the network. Directors sitting on the same board establish links between 
them. The lines between circles are the links betwen vertices (directors). The size of a circle represents the number 






Figure 2a. The network of the financial sector 







Figure 2b. The network of the IT sector 





Figure 3. CEO Remuneration over the whole sample from 1996-2007 
This figure shows the change in the value and structu e of CEO compensation over the whole sample period. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of centrality measures 
This table summarizes the key centrality statistics (degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector cen rality) of the 
companies in the sample. N stands for is the number of observations (firm-years). Note that the number of 
observations is smaller for the closeness measure as closeness cannot be calculated for isolated (non-networked) 
companies. SD stands for standard deviation. P25, P50, and P75 are the values at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. 
The summary statistics are calculated over all firm-years. Below each centrality measure is the normalized version 
denoted by “n”. The centrality measures are calculated using Matlab and Ucinet. Data source: Own calcul tions 
based on BoardEx, Manifest and annual reports. 
 
Panel A: individual level 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
degree 13854 9.99 6.83  0.00  6.00  8.00  11.00  62.00  
(n) degree 13854 0.13 0.10  0.00  0.07  0.11  0.15  1.04  
close 11319 22,500,000  20,900,000 6,513,209 10,500,000 16,800,000 20,000,000 80,200,000 
(n) closeness 11319 0.05 0.02  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.09  
eigen 13854 0.00 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.24  
(n) eigen 13854 0.21 1.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  34.47  
between 13854 10766  34,612  0  0  0  0  536,813  
(n) between 13854 0.04 0.12  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.46  
 
Panel B: company level 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
degree 13854 4.02 3.88  0.00  1.00  3.00  6.00  29.00  
(n) degree 13854 0.35 0.36  0.00  0.09  0.26  0.52  3.49  
close 11319 448,512  381,822  133,702  247,103  290,541  617,579  2,340,900 
(n) closeness 11319 0.36 0.14  0.07  0.25  0.40  0.43  0.59  
eigen 13854 0.01 0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.36  
(n) eigen 13854 1.94 3.68  0.00  0.00  0.48  2.25  50.23  
between 13854 1,403 2,359  0.00  0.00  350  1,839  28,712  
(n) between 13854 0.20 0.34  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.27  5.52  
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Table 2. CEO remuneration 
 
This table shows CEO total remuneration and its components for the whole sample and over the period 1996 to 2007. N is the number of 
observations (firm-years). Mean stands for the averag  value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartiles, respectively. Percent captures the percentag  of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration. The values 
in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are conditional statistics 
based on non-zero values only. Data source: Own calculations based on BoardEx, Manifest, annual reports, and Datastream. 
 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 13,854  202,931  203,891  0  0  166,000  296,600  2,400,000 30.70% 
Salary in cash 3,392  302,738  220,312  1,846  151,086  249,500  395,000  2,248,685  
Salary in shares 8  21,412  27,830  2,993  2,999  5,000  41,374  69,554   
Total fees 13,854  4,032  45,895  0  0  0  0  4,939,000 0.61% 
Fees in cash 685  32,777  50,598  448  19,000  23,000  29,412  1,000,000  
Fees in shares 1  755,555  . 755,555  755,555  755,555  755,555  755,555   
Total bonus 13,854 126,290  357,054  0  0  9,000  120,764  10,000,000 19.11% 
Bonus in cash 7,006  221,039  401,899  130  50,000  112,500  241,000  10,000,000  
Bonus in shares 71  259,067  475,088  2,658  60,000  121,874  254,363  3,116,035  
Bonus vol deferred 74  284,467  299,701  6,445  81,975  166,500  420,000  1,312,500  
Bonus mand deferred 383  351,810  471,916  2,296  90,000  185,853  426,770  3,837,500  
Total equity 13,854  296,215  2,507,032 0  0  0  112,998  186,841,117 44.81% 
Restricted shares 2,724  873,798  3,311,575 2  144,230  335,248  735,428  134,000,000  
Stock options 2,504  724,886  6,170,366 0  85,577  202,765  424,812  186,841,117  
Total miscellaneous 13,854  6,678  100,691  0  0  0  0  6,333,880 1.01% 
Transaction Bonus 24  730,499  1,090,632 25,014  88,604  158,125  1,067,548 4,686,697  
Deferred Cash Bonus 74  315,155  763,065  573  66,973  138,000  299,623  6,333,880  
Loss of Office  88 372,080  327,852  20,775  156,500  267,550  442,500  1,544,745  
Recruitment incentive 29  535,351  800,968  4,556  87,500  221,799  539,000  3,225,044  
Reallocation expenses 28  121,207  134,532  5,000  38,146  72,000  130,055  500,000   
Other 13,854  24,867  102,144  0  0  10,000  20,000  6,624,000 3.76% 
Overall Total 13,854  661,012  2,652,929 0  39,375  253,684  622,868  186,879,117 100% 
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Table 3. CEO characteristics: tenure, age, gender, and board duality 
 
Panels A-D present the data on gender, age, tenure (in y ars). N stands for the number of firm-years. The 
mean is the average value; SD stands for standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the values at the 25% and 
75% quartiles, respectively. The exceptionally old CEO of 97 years is Gerald Ashfield who joined Londo 
and St Lawrence Investment Company plc in 1952. Data source: Own calculations based on BoardEx, 
Manifest and annual reports. 
 
Panel A. Male  N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
CEO 13,289 0.981  0.137  0 1 1 1 1 
Executive dirs. (excl CEO) 35,463 0.961  0.194  0 1 1 1 1 
Non-executive dirs. 62,622 0.946  0.226  0 1 1 1 1 
Panel B. Age         
CEO 13,289 53  8  26  47  53  58  97  
Executive dirs. (excl CEO) 35,463 50  8  25  44  50  55  86  
Non-executive dirs. 62,622 58  8  23  54  59  64  91  
Panel C. Tenure         
CEO 13,289 6  7  0  1  4  8  51  
Executive dirs. (excl CEO) 35,463 7  6  0  3  5  9  90  
Non-executive dirs. 62,622 7  6  0  3  6  9  95  
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Table 4. Board structure and board committees 
 
This table gives an overview of the board compositin and structure and of the board’s committees. In Pa el A, N is the 
number of observations. The mean is the average value; SD stands for standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the values at 
the 25% and 75% quartiles, respectively. Board sizeref rs to the number of directors on the board. Percentage of 
executives is calculated as the number of executive directors divided by board size. The bottom row of Panel A shows 
the percentage of cases where the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Panel B shows the frequency of occurrence of 
the three main board committees in UK listed firms. The denominator is the number of firm years: 13,845). Panel C gives 
details on the staffing of the committees. The first row reports the size of the committee. The second row shows the 
proportion of committees with at least one executive director. The last row shows the average proportion of executives in 
the committee. Panel D reports the CEO’s presence in the committees. Data source: Own calculations based on BoardEx, 
Manifest and annual reports. 
Panel A 
 Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Board size 7.89  3.41 1 6 7 10 26 
Number of executive dirs. 3.35  2.26  0 2 3 5 18 
Percentage of executive dirs 41%  15.0%  0% 25.0%  35.3%  45.5%  100% 
Percentage of male dirs. 96%  8% 0% 92.0% 100% 100% 100% 




Presence of Committee in listed firms  
(13854 firm-years) 
Audit Committee Nomination Committee Remuneration Committee 
Present 98.0% 80.1% 87.7% 
Absent 0.5% 18.4% 10.8% 
Unknown 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 
       
Panel C. Composition of Committee Audit Committee Nomination Committee Remuneration Committee 
Average committee size 3.81 4.30 3.80 
Executive presence in the committee  17.7% 53.5% 20.2% 
Proportion of executives in the committee 2.1% 14.7% 2.3% 
       
Panel D. CEO presence in committees  Audit Committee Nomination Committee Remuneration Committee 
No 80.7% 54.6% 88.8% 
Yes as a Member 13.9% 32.5% 7.8% 
Yes as the Chairman 3.9% 11.4% 1.9% 




Table 5. Ownership concentration 
 
This table shows how ownership concentration has developed over time. The numbers are based on all disc osed ownership 
stakes of 3% or more for all shareholder categories apart from the directors of whom all shareholdings are reported and 
included in this table. The share stake concentration of the executive directors includes that of the CEO. The table also shows 
the share percentages owned by institutions (including banks, insurance companies, investment funds, pension funds), and of 
other outsiders such as corporations and individuals, and families not related to a director. Data source: Own calculations 
based on BoardEx, Manifest and annual reports. 
 
 
 % 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  total 
N 760 807 939 1078 1063 1103 1344 1386 1409 1398  11412 
CEO  1.3% 2.4% 2.8% 3.1% 2.6% 2.6% 2.2% 2.7% 2.6% 2.2%  2.5% 
Executive directors (incl. CEO)  2.6% 4.9% 5.5% 6.0% 4.8% 4.8% 4.1% 4.5% 4.9% 4.4%  4.7% 
Non-executive directors  0.9% 1.8% 2.1% 2.8% 2.2% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2% 2.4% 2.4%  2.1% 
Inside total 3.6% 6.7% 7.5% 8.8% 7.0% 7.0% 6.2% 6.6% 7.3% 6.8%  6.8% 
Nominee accounts 0.7% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 2.1% 2.2% 2.2%  1.5% 
Institutions total 18.2% 19.1% 20.2% 21.6% 22.3% 22.7% 18.0% 20.9% 21.1% 22.3%  20.7% 
Bank funds 2.9% 2.0% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9%  1.7% 
Insurance companies’ funds 6.5% 6.6% 6.2% 4.4% 3.7% 3.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 2.4%  3.8% 
Investment and mutual funds 8.5% 10.1% 12.1% 15.4% 16.4% 16.9% 13.3% 16.1% 16.4% 17.5%  14.7% 
Pension funds 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5%  0.6% 
Individuals and families 5.2% 1.6% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 1.8% 1.5% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3%  1.9% 
Corporations 9.9% 9.0% 7.6% 6.9% 7.2% 7.1% 6.0% 7.6% 7.9% 9.3%  7.8% 
Outside total 34.0% 30.7% 30.5% 31.4% 32.5% 32.7% 26.8% 32.0% 32.7% 35.1%  31.8% 
 
 
Table 6. Random effects models explaining CEO total compensation  
 
The dependent variable in these random effect models is the natural logarithm of the CEOs’ annual total compensation. 
Performance is measured by return on assets and a market-adjusted stock return (with the FTSE All share index as the 
market). The definitions of the centrality measures are given in section 3.2. The D following the names of the centrality 
measures in the column titles refers to centrality measures on the individual director level; C refers to the company level. 
Gender equals to 1 if the director is male. Tenure is the number of years on the board. Committee membership is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the subject is a member in any of the board’s committees. If the CEO is also the chairman, the 
Chairman-CEO duality variable equals 1. Also included is an interaction term between chairmanship and company size 
(measured by Total assets in GBP millions). The notice period is the contractual notice in months thata firm has to give to 
the CEO prior to his dismissal. The proportion of nn-executive and female directors is based on the total number of 
directors. The size of the remuneration consultant is the number of his listed client firms. The ownership concentration data 
by type of shareholder are the accumulated stakes pas ing the 3% disclosure threshold. The director ownership concentration 
data consist of the aggregate of all reported share. Company financial information is gathered from Datastream. The debt to 
assets ratio is the long term debt divided by the total assets. Stock price volatility is the variance of the stock prices over the 
financial year. Four year and twelve industry dummies are also included. Data Source: own calculations based on data from 
BoardEx, Manifest and annual reports, Thomson Financial, and the PricewaterhouseCoopers ownership database. 
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Table 6. (Continued) 
 
 Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
 (1) (2) (3)_ (4) 
Centrality measure Degree (D) Degree (C) nCloseness (D) nCloseness (C) 
 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept 12.4124 0.000 12.3034 0.000 12.4806 0.000 12.2907 0.000 
Performance measures         
Return on assets (%) 0.0045 0.000 0.0044 0.000 0.0042 0.000 0.0040 0.000 
Market-adjusted stock return 0.0002 0.021 0.0002 0.021 0.0002 0.024 0.0002 0.085 
Centrality measure         
Centrality measure 0.0136 0.000 0.0372 0.000 1.7933 0.001 -0.2807 0.032 
CEO characteristics         
Gender (male=1) 0.0150 0.865 -0.0127 0.885 -0.0126 0.887 -0.0535 0.589 
Tenure (months) 0.0068 0.000 0.0079 0.000 0.0077 0.000 0.0070 0.001 
Committee membership (=1) 0.1207 0.000 0.1196 0.000 0.1253 0.000 0.1631 0.000 
CEO=Chairman (=1) -0.2875 0.000 -0.2478 0.000 -0.2669 0.000 -0.2274 0.000 
Duality*firm size 0.0153 0.020 0.0136 0.039 0.0146 0.026 0.0133 0.040 
Notice period (months) 0.0039 0.164 0.0040 0.152 0.0045 0.111 0.0058 0.048 
Board composition         
Proportion nonexecutive directors 0.9046 0.000 0.7637 0.000 0.8625 0.000 0.9157 0.000 
Proportion female directors 0.7917 0.000 0.7058 0.000 0.8261 0.000 0.9518 0.000 
Remuneration consultant networks         
Degree of remuneration consultant  0.0020 0.000 0.0020 0.000 0.0020 0.000 0.0019 0.000 
Consultant network degree*firm size 0.0000 0.039 0.0000 0.031 0.0000 0.047 0.0000 0.843 
Ownership concentration         
CEO stock holdings -0.0052 0.000 -0.0053 0.000 -0.0055 0.000 -0.0067 0.000 
Executive directors. stock holdings -0.0017 0.185 -0.0011 0.409 -0.0014 0.274 -0.0028 0.047 
Non-executive dir. stock holdings -0.0015 0.277 -0.0010 0.462 -0.0012 0.374 -0.0016 0.303 
Nominee account block holdings -0.0042 0.010 -0.0040 0.015 -0.0041 0.012 -0.0011 0.567 
Institutional investors’ block holdings 0.0020 0.001 0.0018 0.002 0.0017 0.002 0.0009 0.149 
Corporations’ block holdings -0.0004 0.602 0.0000 0.963 -0.0002 0.800 -0.0006 0.514 
Individuals and families’ block holdings -0.0031 0.057 -0.0030 0.069 -0.0034 0.037 -0.0048 0.008 
Firm size, capital structure and risk         
Total assets 0.0001 0.788 0.0002 0.418 0.0001 0.587 0.0010 0.008 
Debt to asset ratio 0.0027 0.000 0.0024 0.000 0.0027 0.000 0.0024 0.001 
Stock price volatility -0.0068 0.000 -0.0060 0.000 -0.0072 0.000 -0.0076 0.000 
R-squared 0.3484 0.3716 0.3142 0.3157 
Number of observations 6773 6773 6773  5839 
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Table 7. Random effects model explaining CEO pay-for-performance sensitive  
The dependent variable is the difference between current year total compensation and that of the previous year.  
 Dependent variable: change in CEO total compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Centrality measure Degree (D) Degree (C) nCloseness (D) nCloseness (C) 
 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept -1412719 0.000 -1369275 0.000 -1215036 0.006 -1130887 0.018 
Performance measures         
Return on assets (%) -336.8 0.905 588.6 0.771 2378.0 0.420 10111.9 0.036 
Market-adjusted stock return 685.1 0.263 478.1 0.212 261.6 0.647 -649.6 0.594 
Centrality measure         
Centrality measure 7469.2 0.085 3477.3 0.661 -928624.6 0.500 -291071.3 0.491 
Centrality measure * Return on asset (%) 206.7 0.486 261.2 0.574 -24585.0 0.652 -24647.7 0.057 
Centrality measure * Market-adjusted 
return -120.6 0.099 -337.6 0.002 -11408.2 0.315 314.6 0.921 
CEO characteristics         
Gender (male=1) 231534.5 0.227 244213.6 0.203 248487.1 0.195 290942.9 0.225 
Tenure (months) 18663.4 0.000 19160.1 0.000 19095.0 0.000 24595.3 0.000 
Committee membership (=1) 76242.8 0.170 87919.7 0.113 88413.2 0.110 86399.1 0.184 
CEO=Chairman (=1) -1797.7 0.983 -3165.1 0.970 -10541.2 0.899 3074.6 0.976 
Duality*firm size 15594.5 0.458 17506.1 0.404 17878.6 0.394 16492.7 0.468 
Notice period (months) 4165.1 0.518 4370.5 0.498 4535.1 0.482 5600.3 0.473 
Board composition         
Proportion nonexecutive directors 947533.8 0.000 981613.9 0.000 1004398.0 0.000 1167013.0 0.000 
Proportion female directors 454863.4 0.209 510939.9 0.159 517574.3 0.152 647428.  0.126 
Remuneration consultant networks         
Degree of remuneration consultant  -204.0 0.608 -74.4 0.853 -84.7 0.831 -270.7 0.542 
Consultant network degree*firm size 8.2 0.095 8.7 0.075 9.1 0.062 6.5 0.321 
Ownership concentration         
CEO stock holdings 1447.7 0.655 1180.8 0.715 938.2 0.772 353.2 0.930 
Executive directors. stock holdings 6100.9 0.070 6244.9 0.064 6061.9 0.072 7419.3 0.072 
Non-executive dir. stock holdings -1063.8 0.749 -1302.4 0.697 -1709.1 0.609 -2034.7 0.639 
Nominee account block holdings 1069.5 0.798 1326.2 0.751 736.5 0.860 2227.8 0.677 
Institutional investors’ block holdings 2399.8 0.106 2205.6 0.137 2091.0 0.156 2617.5 0.125 
Corporations’ block holdings -3280.5 0.099 -3129.5 0.117 -3320.5 0.095 -4262.1 0.071 
Individuals and families’ block holdings 950.8 0.814 495.3 0.902 294.4 0.942 -224.9 0.962 
Firm size, capital structure and risk         
Total assets -113.8 0.781 -123.6 0.763 -156.9 0.702 542.5 0.517 
Debt to asset ratio -816.7 0.537 -802.6 0.545 -578.9 0.662 -1003.8 0.536 
Stock price volatility  8.5 0.997 -221.9 0.918 -357.1 0.868 -67.8 0.979 
R-squared 0.0261 0.0270 0.0271 0.0331 
Number of observations 5131 5131 5131 4384 
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Table 8 Heckman sample selection models explaining CEO total compensation  
The table below shows the results from the regression equation of the Heckman sample selection equations. 
 
 Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Centrality measure Degree (D) Degree (C) nCloseness (D) nCloseness (C) 
 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept 11.6193 0.000 11.7811 0.000 11.7591 0.000 12.3836 0.000 
         
Performance measures         
Return on assets (%) 0.0065 0.000 0.0064 0.000 0.0065 0.000 0.0069 0.000 
Market-adjusted stock return 0.0002 0.166 0.0002 0.116 0.0001 0.509 0.0002 0.355 
Centrality measure         
Centrality measure 0.0385 0.000 0.0842 0.000 2.2339 0.000 -0.9001 0.000 
CEO characteristics         
Gender (male=1) 0.1721 0.031 0.1091 0.166 0.2025 0.014 0.0749 0.417 
Tenure (months) -0.0017 0.353 0.0004 0.804 -0.0001 0.945 0.0025 0.217 
Committee membership (=1) 0.1533 0.000 0.1476 0.000 0.2096 0.000 0.2563 0.000 
CEO=Chairman (=1) -0.3343 0.000 -0.2244 0.000 -0.3289 0.000 -0.2396 0.000 
Duality*firm size 0.0359 0.000 0.0361 0.000 0.0468 0.000 0.0396 0.000 
Notice period (months) -0.0022 0.400 -0.0031 0.224 -0.0008 0.769 0.0025 0.403 
Board composition         
Proportion nonexecutive directors 1.6030 0.000 1.2854 0.000 1.7617 0.000 1.7716 0.000 
Proportion female directors 1.0307 0.000 0.8281 0.000 1.2423 0.000 1.1883 0.000 
Remuneration consultant networks         
Degree of remuneration consultant  0.0032 0.000 0.0028 0.000 0.0036 0.000 0.0031 0.000 
Consultant network degree*firm size 0.0000 0.294 0.0000 0.248 0.0000 0.074 0.0000 0.416 
Ownership concentration         
CEO stock holdings -0.0035 0.012 -0.0043 0.002 -0.0055 0.000 -0.0089 0.000 
Executive directors. stock holdings -0.0029 0.041 -0.0001 0.951 -0.0019 0.187 -0.0014 0.366 
Non-executive dir. stock holdings -0.0087 0.000 -0.0062 0.000 -0.0100 0.000 -0.0096 0.000 
Nominee account block holdings -0.0045 0.013 -0.0034 0.054 -0.0051 0.006 -0.0028 0.184 
Institutional investors’ block holdings -0.0015 0.019 -0.0015 0.011 -0.0033 0.000 -0.0047 0.000 
Corporations’ block holdings -0.0017 0.039 0.0004 0.611 -0.0010 0.251 -0.0019 0.037 
Individuals and families’ block holdings -0.0115 0.000 -0.0101 0.000 -0.0144 0.000 -0.0134 0.000 
Firm size, Capital structure and risk         
Total assets -0.0003 0.210 -0.0002 0.391 -0.0003 0.221 0.0028 0.000 
Debt to asset ratio 0.0032 0.000 0.0028 0.000 0.0038 0.000 0.0039 0.000 
Stock price volatility -0.0026 0.002 -0.0006 0.474 -0.0041 0.000 -0.0061 0.000 
P-value chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 6564 6564 6564 5630 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Description Source 
Remuneration   
Total Sum of all remuneration items listed below. Annual 
reports/Manifest/BoardEx 
Salary Fixed remuneration paid to executive directors idem 
Fee Fixed remuneration mainly paid to non-executive d r ctors. idem 
Bonus Performance-related remuneration paid out annually idem 
Equity-based compensation Remuneration paid as restrict d shares and stock options (valued by means of 
Black-Scholes formula) 
idem 
Miscellaneous  Sum of transaction bonus, deferred cash bonus, severance pay, recruitment 
incentive and relocation fee 
idem 
Other Sum of rare remuneration components such as e.g. m dical insurance idem 
Performance indicator   
Return on assets Net income prior to financing costs divided by total assets then multiplied by 
100. 
Datastream 
Market-adjusted stock return Annual stock return mius the return of the FT All Share index  Datastream 
Centrality measure   
Degree (ndegree) Number of links of a vertex.(normalized degree)  Own calculations based 
on Annual 
reports/Manifest/BoardEx 
Closeness (ncloseness) The inverse of the geodesic istance from a vertex to all reachable vertices. 
(normalized closeness) 
idem 
Betweenness (nbetweenness) The probability that a specific vertex is on the geodesic path between any 




The aggregation of centralities of adjacent vertices. (normalized eigenvector) idem 
CEO information   
Gender (male) Equals 1 if male and 0 if female. idem 
Tenure Number of years in current position idem 
Committee membership Equals 2 if chairman of a specific committee, 1 if member, 0 if not member. idem 
Chairmanship-CEO duality Equals 1 if the target CEO is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. idem 
Notice period The notice period is the contractual notice in months that a company has to 
give to the CEO before his dismissal. 
idem 
Board composition   
Prop. Nonexecutives directors Proportion of non-executive directors on board (denominator is total board 
size) 
idem 
Prop. female directors Proportion by female directors on board (denominator is total board size) idem 
Remuneration consultant networks  
Size remuneration consultant 
network 
The number of firms to which a remuneration consultant gives advice  idem 
Ownership structure   
CEO stock holding The CEO’s share stake. idem 
Executive stock holding  The sum of all executive dir ctors’ stock holdings. idem 
Non executive stock holding The sum of all non-executive directors’ stock holdings. idem 
Nominee account block holding The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more on nominee accounts.  idem 
Institutional block holding The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by banks, insurance 
companies, pension funds and investment, and mutual funds. 
idem 
Corporate block holding The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by industrial or commercial 
firms. 
idem 
Individual block holding The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by individuals or families not
related to a director. 
idem 
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Firm size, Capital structure and 
risk 
  
Total assets Sum of total current assets, long term r ceivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and 
equipment and other assets, except for financial companies. 
Datastream 
Debt to asset ratio Sum of short term debt, current portion of long term debt and long term debt 
divided by total assets then multiplied by 100, except for financial companies. 
idem 
Stock price volatility The stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean 




Appendix B. A Director Network Graph 




An example of director network  
These tables explain how director networks are mathematically recorded and calculated. Panel A is an 
overview on the example network. Panel B is the matrix used to record the network. Panel C calculated th  
geodesic distance between each pair of directors. Panel D shows the basic centrality measures calculated 
for this example network. 
 
Panel A : Example of a network 
 
Company Director  Company Director 
1 a  5 a 
   5 b 
2 b  5 j 
2 c  5 f 
   5 d 
3 a    
3 e  6 b 
3 f  6 g 
   6 d 
4 h  6 e 
4 d  6 h 
4 i  6 i 
4 j    
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Panel B : Matrix representation of above table.  
 
  a b c d e f g h i j 
a 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
b 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
c 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
e 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
f 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
g 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
h 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
i 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
j  1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 
Panel C : Geodesic distances 
 
 a b c d e f g h i j 
a 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
b 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
c 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
d 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
e 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 
f 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 
g 2 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 
h 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 
i 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
j 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 
 
Panel D : Centrality measures 
 
 Degree Closeness Eigenvector  Betweenness 
a       6    12.000      0.299      0.167 
b       9     9.000      0.379      8.933 
c       1    17.000      0.054      0.000 
d       8    10.000      0.372      0.933 
e       7    11.000      0.336      0.567 
f       7    11.000      0.336      0.567 
g       6    12.000      0.299      0.167 
h       6    12.000      0.293      0.367 
i       8   10.000      0.372      0.933 
j       6   12.000      0.293      0.367 
 
